

XXX Legat, Tokyo

September 15, 1966

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b7EDirector, FBI **CHALMERS JOHNSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING -
FOREIGN MISCELLANEOUS***Ref*~~XXXXXXXXXX~~b6
b7C

Attached is the translation which you requested by letter dated **8/30/66**.

The contents thereof, where pertinent, must be reported under appropriate captions and afforded whatever investigative attention is necessary.

Disposition of the foreign language material submitted in this connection is set forth below:

Returned herewith.

Tolson _____
 DeLoach _____
 Mohr _____
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1 - Los Angeles - Enclosures (3) (2 translations, 1 relet)
1 - San Francisco - Enclosures (3) (2 translations, 1 relet)
1 - Mr. Sullivan (Attn.: Mr. Bland), sent direct with enclosures (2).
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit without enclosure, sent direct.

RCH:jab (7)
Enc. (5)

MAILED 7

SEP 16 1966

COMM-FBI

62 SEP 21 1966

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

TRANSLATION FROM JAPANESE

To:

From:

I am glad that you are back. Thanks for your trouble. I noted the matter in your letter of July 21.

TRANSLATED BY:

cca

September 13, 1966

ENCLOSURE

TRANSLATION FROM JAPANESE

" CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR C. JOHNSON OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA " (July 29, 1966, KDK No. 58)

Inviting Associate Professor Chalmers Johnson of the University of California, who had been engaged in research work in Tokyo since last May, to the Institute, a conversation was held from 10:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., July 28, 1966, and views were exchanged on the problems of Communist China and Vietnam. The points of the conversation, which seem to be important, are summarized as follows:

NOTE

Professor Johnson is a distinguished disciple of Professor Scalappi and an able young scholar, who has become well known in Japan by his book on the case of Sorge. Prior to his arrival in Japan, he had stayed in Hong Kong and Saigon for a long time and expects to return home around August 5.

The conversation was held in the form of asking my opinion from Professor Johnson. The subjects taken up by Professor Johnson were all those I wanted to take up and after stating his opinion on each subject, Professor Johnson asked for my opinion. I gained much from it as it was a piquant conversation.

1. The first problem taken up was the proletarian cultural revolution of Communist China. However, my opinion was expressed in the July 12 edition of "World Weekly" and a copy of it was forwarded to Professor Johnson by [redacted] of the East Asian Library, the University of California. In general we agreed on the opinion.

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NOTE

During his stay in Hong Kong, Professor Johnson mostly studied the Liberation Army under the command of LIN Piao, 2651/1753, and its social position in Communist China. He briefly explained them. As his report began to appear serially in "Current Scene" on July 1, it is omitted here (the first part has arrived and it is under study).

TRANSLATED BY:

[redacted] cca
September 13, 1966

RCV

In the course of exchanging views, Professor Johnson stated that the revolutionary idea of MAO Tse-tung was not pure Marxism as it existed before Marxism. When the question of pure Marxism was raised, I stated that the revolutionary idea of MAO Tse-tung is an old traditional Chinese revolutionary idea, and as Marx-Leninism was applied to this idea, it could be called "Primitive Marxism," and that Marxism, which was developed in accordance with the practical conditions in the Soviet Union and Europe, might be called "Pure Marxism." Professor Johnson also stated that Marxism was generally accepted in the present international Communist movement. Basically we had no differences of opinion.

2. The next problem taken up was the problems of Communist China's nuclear development and Japan's security. Professor Johnson asked me about the following questions:
 - A. The United States takes an optimistic view of Communist China's threats because it will take more than 10 years before it can develop the nuclear weapons and their delivery system, and it does not seem to be fully concerned about the imminent threats of Communist China's nuclear weapons to Japan. What about this point?
 - (2) In the practical sense, Communist China may not use nuclear weapons against Japan. However, with the backing of nuclear weapons, it possibly might engage in threatening propaganda and agitations against Japan. In other words, Communist China may use nuclear weapons as a psychological means. What about this point?
 - (3) Recently university professors seriously discussed Japan's security problem. Newspapers and magazines also seem to have taken up this question. What are the cause and motive?
 - (4) When the existing security treaty expires in 1970, Japan and the United States should, in view of the changed situation, talk together on an equal footing and should, keeping the Japanese people's sentiment in mind, reconsider the problems of military bases and United States Armed Forces in Japan. What about this point?

My views in response to the above questions were expressed as follows:

- A. I expressed my full agreement on the points of Nos. (1) and (2). Concerning the point of No. (2) in particular, I pointed out that when the security treaty was renewed in 1960, the Soviet Union constantly employed nuclear threats through several diplomatic notes and propaganda and agitations and that at this time, Communist China would probably employ nuclear threats through threatening propaganda and agitations in order to divide the Japanese people's opinion and promote the mass struggle. In the meantime, I stated that the Japanese people, depending on the United States nuclear retaliatory power as well as in 1960, would not be disturbed, but we strictly watch the infiltration of the left wing into the simple masses and an extension of its influence among them.
- B. Concerning the point of No. (3), Professor Johnson seemed to have expected me to say that the security discussion of Japan was caused by the nuclear development of Communist China. However, without touching this problem, I pointed out that in his speech of administration policies before the regular session of the Diet, Premier Sato positively took up the security problem, that in an argument with the opposition parties in the Diet, the Premier displayed his positive attitude toward the security problem, and that the Government and the Liberal-Democratic Party published a positive opinion on the security problem. I also explained that the Government and the Liberal-Democratic Party, having changed the passive attitude, took the initiative from the opposition parties, sincerely discussed the security problem with the people and tried hard to make them understand the necessity of the Japanese-American security treaty. Professor Johnson appeared to be deeply impressed.
- C. Concerning the point of No. (4), I agreed on the point that Japan and the United States should talk together on an equal footing, but expressed a slightly different view on the problems of military bases and United States Armed Forces in Japan.
- a. Full consideration should be given to the Japanese people's sentiment. The Democratic Socialist Party advocates the retention of United States Armed Forces in an emergency, which is similar to your view. The theory of the Democratic Socialist Party means an increase of the Self-Defense Forces. This is merely an idealistic view because the Self-Defense Forces are not well equipped to defend Japan until military support arrives from the United States.
- b. Constant preparations to meet an emergency are required in modern warfare. Only full preparations to meet an emergency can effectively prevent war, and the type of military alliance that existed in the 19th century and in the early part of the 20th century can no longer prevent modern war.

- c. The arbitrary action of General de Gaulle, who did not understand this point, weakened the position of NATO to meet an emergency. The situation of Asia is more serious than that of Europe. In order to meet an emergency provoked by the Soviet Union and Communist China, the retention of United States Armed Forces and military bases in Japan is necessary for some time.
- D. I stated that in view of the nuclear development of Communist China, the Japanese people gradually saw the necessity of the Japanese-American security treaty, and we have gained our confidence to make the majority of the people understand the necessity, but the only present obstacle is that the people have an uneasy feeling about the Vietnam war the escalation of which may lead to a Sino-American war and the involvement of Japan into it. I also pointed out that although there was no possibility of Communist China's intervention and the White House was holding firmly the line of de-escalation, the problem was the trend of American public opinion.
- E. In connection with this, I suggested the following points:
 - a. Opening of a world-wide political war against the plans of Communist China,
 - b. Recapturing the initiative in the battle field against the Viet Cong with a superior air force and its air maneuverability,
 - c. Adopting of a drastic reform policy in order to win the people's support while suppressing the Viet Cong.

I stated that I had nothing further to add as the above three points were taken care of by the United States. However, I stressed, as the most important thing today, the creation of a peaceful atmosphere in Vietnam by alienating Hanoi from Peking thereby a de-escalation of the war could possibly be brought about.

Professor Johnson expressed his complete agreement (an explanation is made in KDK No. 57).

- 3. In this manner the conversation was shifted to the problem of Vietnam. Professor Johnson made the following important statement:

"I had talks with American diplomats and military personnel in Saigon. All of them expressed their dissatisfaction with Japan because Japan was taking a critical attitude without assisting the United States in spite of the fact that Japan

was making most profit in the Vietnam war. This is a dangerous trend in the future relations between Japan and the United States."

When I made the following explanation, Professor Johnson agreed with me:

- (1) Japan is supporting the United States policy in Vietnam with every political, economic, and technical means (except military means). The American diplomats and military personnel are not satisfied with Japan because Japan does not assist the United States militarily and the anti-Vietnam war force is strong in Japan.
 - (2) The reason why Japan cannot support the United States with military means is the Constitution received in the time of General MacArthur, and the reason why the anti-Vietnam war force is strong in Japan is that the Japanese people's way of thinking was completely changed under the occupation policy. We are making an effort to change them to Japanese-like Japanese, but we are helpless for the time being. The American people should understand this point.
4. After expressing his following views on the conduct of the Vietnam war, Professor Johnson asked for my views:
- (1) The purpose of the United States intervention in the Vietnam problem is to prevent the development of World War III by checking the advance of Communist China into Southeast Asia. However, Communist China's policy toward Southeast Asia suffered a blow by the political change of Indonesia, and Communist China's policy toward Africa and Asia completely failed. At the present time, the great purpose of preventing World War III is meaningless.
 - (2) At the present time, the purpose has become narrowed down to the stabilization of the Vietnam situation by assisting the Government. A great deal of criticism has begun to appear in America and in our opinion, this criticism is justifiable. As many young American lives are being sacrificed, the purpose of the Vietnam war should be made clear. What are your views? (it is said that the United States' position is even against a revolution).
 - (3) The United States is urged to materialize the Honolulu Declaration in order to win the Vietnam people's support. As a matter

of fact, the promotion of the Honolulu Declaration is not popular in America because of a strong criticism. Can Japan, the Philippines, or other Asian nations give strong support to the Honolulu Declaration?

In response to Professor Johnson's request, I expressed the following views:

- A. Concerning the point of No. (1), it is still difficult to say that the advance of Communist China into Southeast Asia, which may be the cause of World War III, was checked by the political change of Indonesia and Communist China's policy failure in Africa and Asia. The United States can stop the advance of Communist China into Vietnam. However, Communist China may push directly into Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma. For this reason, the great purpose should not be withdrawn.
- B. Concerning the point of No. (2), the United States has no other alternative but to stabilize the Vietnam situation strategically, to suppress the Viet Cong militarily, to carry out a reform policy by promoting the Honolulu Declaration politically, and to realize two Vietnams (Professor Johnson said that the idea of two Vietnams had not come up in America). The United States places too much emphasis on the artificial "parliamentary democratic government." In the present stage where the first objective is suppressing the Viet Cong, the military regime should be given all the possible assistance. As Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky are both young, old and experienced advisors (Japanese, Filipino, Malayan, or other Asian) should be assigned to them in order to conduct the administration skillfully.
- C. Concerning the point of No. (3), if the United States has some difficulties in promoting the Honolulu Declaration, the Southeast Asia Development Bank, the Ministerial Council for Southeast Asia Development, the League of Asian Nations' Congressmen, (these organizations are being promoted by Japan), the Council of Asian Labor Unions, and the League of Asian Buddhists (these organizations are being planned), can be substituted. However, as these organizations cannot be managed by South Vietnam alone, able and experienced statesmen and economists can be assigned as advisors to the leaders of South Vietnam so that they can maintain close contact with the United States organizations in Vietnam and with their home countries and let the leaders of South Vietnam promote the Honolulu Declaration.

- D. In dealing with the Buddhists of Vietnam, who can easily upset the political situation in Vietnam, the United States Government may get some Japanese Buddhist statesmen, who are greatly interested in the Vietnamese affairs.

Professor Johnson was greatly impressed when I suggested the employment of Asian advisors.

Remarks

At the beginning of the conversation, I told Professor Johnson that American scholars and intellectuals usually contacted [redacted] in case they wanted to contact Japanese scholars and intellectuals. Those who are introduced by [redacted] are mostly liberals, and Americans may misunderstand the Japanese opinion through them. I gave Professor Johnson a warning against this danger.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 8/30/66

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FROM : Legd Attache, TOKYO

SUBJECT: CHALMERS JOHNSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING -
FOREIGN MISCELLANEOUS

Attn: FBI Laboratory

Request the enclosed Japanese language material, which is described below, be translated ☒ verbatim ☐ in summary and the translation distributed as indicated.

Description of Material: Report

Dated 7/29/66 and received here on 8/16/66
under confidential classification from: KDK Research Institute,
Tokyo

Disposition of Material:

- ☒ Return to this Office
☐ Retain at Bureau
☐ Other:

Disposition of translations:

- 1 copies to San Francisco
1 copies to Los Angeles
2 copies to Tokyo
 copies to

Communication for dissemination to be prepared by Tokyo office.

Remarks: Enclosure relates to one CHALMERS JOHNSON described as an Associate Professor at the University of California, location not stated.

Tokyo indices reflect references to one

FBI Number

date of birth

or Alabama, who settled in Japan after discharge from the U. S. Armed Forces in and was arrested by Japanese police in

 This individual apparently is not identical.

Perusal of enclosure suggests that type of research in which subject engaged in Japan may be of interest to the Bureau.

Los Angeles and San Francisco requested to advise result of indices check.

Status: P

5 - Bureau - Enc. (1 - Foreign Liaison; 1 - Los Angeles; 1 - San Francisco)
1 - Tokyo
HLC:kvw
(6)

ENCLOSURE

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9-6-66
COPY AND SPEC. IS RETAINED IN LAB.
FOR LAB. ACTION AND REPORT

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Let to Tokyo
with encl (5)
RCH:jah
9/15/66
1 - Los Angeles
4 - Bureau (3)
1 - San Francisco
w/encl (3)
(2 - M returned)
(herewith)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI [REDACTED]

FROM : Legat, Tokyo [REDACTED] (RUC)

SUBJECT: CHALMERS JOHNSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING -
FOREIGN MISCELLANEOUS

DATE: 10/25/66

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ReBulet 9/15/66.

This case was opened for the purpose of determining whether there was any information in the Japanese material received which would be of Bureau interest.

Upon receipt of the translation, it was thoroughly reviewed and determined that, though interesting in a general way, there was actually nothing deserving of further consideration from the standpoint of Bureau responsibility.

Currently, there are indices checks outstanding with the Los Angeles and San Francisco Offices. However, since there is no further investigation to be conducted by this office, this matter is being considered RUC.

7-Bureau

- (1 - Liaison Section)
- (2 - San Francisco)
- (2 - Los Angeles)
- 1 - Tokyo

11-2-66- RUC

RVP:fo
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REC-9 [REDACTED]

10 OCT 27 1966

EX-108

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

DATE: 11/16/66

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES [REDACTED]

RUC)

b3
b7ESUBJECT: CHALMERS JOHNSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING -
FOREIGN MISCELLANEOUS

ReBulet to Legat, Tokyo, 9/15/66.

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Los Angeles indices contain no information identifiable with subject. A review of local telephone directories reveals one CHALMERS JOHNSON resides at 1352 South Palm Avenue, La Habra, California, telephone OW 7-1133.

On 11/9,15/66 [REDACTED] reviewed faculty membership lists for the University of Southern California, University of California at Los Angeles, Santa Ana Junior College, California State College of Fullerton, California State College at Long Beach, and the University of California at Irvine. The subject was not identified in any of these lists.

On 11/15/66 Mrs. FLORENCE MOGELEFSKY, Credit Bureau of Northern Orange County, Anaheim, California, advised that she could locate no record identifiable with CHALMERS JOHNSON, 1352 South Palm Avenue, La Habra, California.

Inasmuch as subject is probably employed at the University of California at Berkeley, no further investigation is being conducted at Los Angeles.

3- Bureau (REGISTERED)
1- Legat, Tokyo [REDACTED]
1- San Francisco (Info)(REGISTERED)
1- Los Angeles
NRJ:fet
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EX-103

REC-23

23
NOV 18 1966

Copy to *Tokyo*
by routing slip, for
☒ info ☐ action

Info

11/23/66

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56 NOV 28 1966

LIASON

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED]

DATE: 11/21/66

FROM : *LM* SAC, SAN FRANCISCO [REDACTED] (X)

b3
b7E

SUBJECT: CHANGED
CHALMERS A. JOHNSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING
FOREIGN MISCELLANEOUS

Johnson, Chalmers
Title is changed to CHALMERS A. JOHNSON by addition of middle initial as obtained from UC directory.

Re Legat, Tokyo, letters to Director 8/30/66 and 10/25/66, and Bulet 9/15/66.

The 1965-66 University of California Directory (UC) lists CHALMERS A. JOHNSON, Associate Professor, Political Science Department, Berkeley, residing 1058A Keith Avenue, Albany, California, telephone 526-7808. His office was in Room 210, Barrows Hall. It showed further that he was married and absent on leave.

On basis of above data, SF FBI Office indices reflect following data which may pertain to JOHNSON:

One CHALMER JOHNSON was among signers of a letter dated 6/24/42 at Farmersville, Tulare County, California, to Lt. General JOHN L. DeWITT protesting evacuation of Japanese.

On 4/4/58 an auto bearing a license registered to CHALMER A. or EVELYN JOHNSON, Route 1, Box 168, Gridley, California, was observed in the vicinity of the UC Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, California, at a time when a vigil was held there by persons protesting nuclear weapons tests, according to San Francisco Operations Office of the AEC.

A flier announcing a conference on "Alternatives to Vietnam" to be held on 11/9/63 in San Francisco listed CHALMERS A. JOHNSON, Assistant Professor of Political Science, UC Berkeley, as speaking on "The Politics of Guerrilla

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3 - Bureau (RM)

1 - Legat, Tokyo (64-273) 11/25/66

1 - San Francisco

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56 DEC 2 1966

REC 32

12 NOV 23 1966

EX 101

NAT. INT. SEC.

CHALMERS A. JOHNSON

Warfare." It described JOHNSON as specializing in Chinese studies; spent summer of 1962 in Saigon; author of classic study of guerrilla warfare, "Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power."

This flier showed the conference was sponsored by such groups as the American Friends Service Committee, Friends Committee on Legislation, Northern California-Nevada Council of Churches' Commission on International Affairs and including Women for Peace of San Francisco, Oakland and Berkeley, as well as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

CHALMERS A. JOHNSON, Political Science, was among UC, Berkeley, faculty members signing a telegram to President JOHNSON protesting U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic according to an ad, sponsored by the Faculty Peace Committee, appearing in "The Daily Californian", UC campus newspaper, on 5/13/65.

Inasmuch as Legat, Tokyo, advised that review of translation revealed nothing deserving further consideration from the standpoint of Bureau responsibility, no investigation of JOHNSON is being undertaken and no LHM is being submitted.

MAILED

JAN 9 1968

NAME CHECK

January 8, 1968

CHALMERS A. JOHNSON
Born: August 6, 1931

CHALMERS A. JOHNSON


No investigation pertinent to your inquiry has been conducted by the FBI concerning the captioned individual. However, the files of this Bureau reveal the following information which may relate to the subject of your name check request.

The May 13, 1965, issue of "The Daily Californian," a University of California campus newspaper, contained an ad, sponsored by the faculty Peace Committee, listing faculty members signing a telegram to President Johnson protesting United States invasion of the Dominican Republic. Among the signers was one Chalmers A. Johnson, Professor, Political Science Department, University of California.

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Original and 1 - USIA
Request Received - 1/8/68

GWP:wdd
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CC TO: State
REQ. REC'D 3-14-68
APR 3 1968
ANS.
BY: [redacted] HSC

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REC 37

301-27



MAR 10 1968

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI, and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. This reply is result of check of FBI investigative files. To check arrest records, request must be submitted to FBI Identification Division. Fingerprints are necessary for positive check.

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR
ADD. DISSEMINATION

332

5-2-68 1 51968

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☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527 b6
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524 b7C
☐ Forward to File Review
☐ Attention ☐
☒ Return to ☐ 612510
Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☒ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

☒ Restricted to Locality of Cal
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Subject Johnson, Chalmers H.
 Birthdate & Place _____
 Address _____

Localities _____

R# _____ Date 7/8 Initials CO

Prod. _____

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